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PROFIT WINDFALL OR PATIENT WINDFALL?
The Orphan Drug Act and Proposals for its Reform
'[Tihe impact on those aicted by currently untreatable rare conditions must
be at the forefront of our assessment. Those who wish to alter fundamentally
the highly successful incentive situation of the current law should face a heavy
burden in demonstrating that any proposed changes would benet, and not
undermine, the orphan drug development process.1
Student ID# 603-8913-60
January 27, 1994
1The Orphan Drug Act2 is a statute with a noble purpose but a controversial
history. Originally designed to spur research into drugs for conditions with
extremely limited patient populations,~ the Act has become a highly successful
means of developing new drugs for rare diseases and conditions. In total, these
conditions aect a signicant percentage of the population { as many as 1 out of
every 13 Americans.4 In the ten years prior to the Act's passage, only ten drugs
had been approved for these conditions, but by December 31, 1993, 569 drugs
had received designation as orphan drugs under the Act; of these, over 65 had
been approved.5 Few, then, would dispute that for its intended purpose { benet
to patients suering from rare conditions { the Act has worked successfully.6
Unusually for such a popular and successful program, however, the Act has
attracted frequent recommendations for change and has in fact been amended
several times { in 1984,~ 1985,8 and 1988.~ Extensive proposals for reform were
also seriously advanced in Congress in 1990 and 1992. Part of the reason for
this interest stems from the statutory implication that orphan drugs are meant
to be drugs of little commercial value.10
In particular, much attention on reforming the Act has arisen as a result
of three instances in which high prots or high prices to consumers have led
to criticism of orphan drug designations { human growth hormone (hGH), ery-
thropoietin (EPO), and pentamidine.1' Following Willie Sutton's view on banks,
commentators have focused on these drugs because that is where the money is.
Approved to treat pituitary growth hormone deciency, hGH has cost be-
tween $10,000 and $30,000 per year.12 The drug has been particularly contro-
versial because ve compani~s have pursued hGH (and the resulting commercial
potential for o-label applications is thought to belie its status as an orphan)
and because of the view that the incentives of the Orphan Drug Act had nothing
to do with Genentech's decision to develop hGH.'3
EPO, which stimulates the growth of red blood cells, is approved for the
treatment of end-stage renal disease but is potentially useful (and highly prof-
itable) in treating a variety of anemias. The drug costs about $8000 per year;
most of it (about $400 million worth) is bought by Medicare.'4 The company
maintains that its high price reects its development costs.15 The drug is con-
troversial because it was approved for anemia within a certain
discrete population ... at a time when it had already become the standard
of care within another, people with
,,16
AZT-induced anemia.
1
2Pentamidine treats pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP), a major com-
plication of AIDS. After the existing manufacturing capability of the drug was
destroyed, the Centers for Disease Control recrulted Lyphomed -
- then a small biotechnology company { to produce the drug, after
refusals from other companies.17 The drug cost about $1000 per year in 1990.18
It has attracted great interest not only because of its AIDS-related indication
but because of its high price and a controversy regarding approval of a dierent
form of treatment.'9
it is clear that Congress did not intend these and simliar results when it
passed the Act. But the fact remains { and this has always been the primary
cause for unease about signicant reform of the Act { that drugs such as pen-
tamidine and EPO would not have been developed without the incentives of the
Orphan Drug Act.~ These drugs frame the issues { shared exclusivity, patient
cap, sales cap { that have fueled the debate over reform of the Act.
It is not the purpose of this paper to solve the problems posed by these
three drugs. As of 1990, only six orphan drugs were approved for populations
greater than 50,000; in 1992, of the designations 87% of the marketing are for
patient populations of less than 100,000; 69% are for less than 50,000; 47% are
for less than 25,000.ti21 Instead, the author's perspective is to ensure that such
drugs do not act as spoilers for the incentives to achieve the purpose of the
Act { to encourage research into orphan conditions. Overinclusive reform could
have a signicant chilling eect on research and development of orphan drugs
{ particularly given Congress' frequent attention to the Act, which puts drug
companies in the spotlight. Proponents of extensive reform point to provisions in
the Act (particularly the idea of a race to approval) in which market mechanisms
act as a disincentive to research. Yet the very success of the Act belies this
notion. The heavy hand of government is more likely than the invisible hand of
the market to dampen research.
In 1990, there was once again a signicant Congressional move to reform
the Act. Notably, the proposed H.R. 4638 would have adopted a provision
on ~~shared exclusivity' for marketing if drugs were developed simultaneously
and required companies (and FDA) to estimate the patient population for an
orphan condition at a date three years after the date of designation. The bill
provided for three conditions to be met for the simultaneous development that
would lead to shared exclusivity: the sponsor of the second drug must request
designation within six months of the publication of the initial designation, must
begin human clinical trials not later
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3than 12 months after the initial sponsor, and must submit the application
not later than 12 months after the initial sponsor. Although the bill repre-
sented a hard-fought compromise among Congress, patient advocacy groups,
and industry, President Bush pocket vetoed the bill on November 8, 1990.~
The President's statement gave several reasons for the veto. Most important,
he stated that individuals with rare diseases may suer if the bill became law.
He attributed the program's success in large measure to the provision for mar-
ket exclusivity. By adopting shared exclusivity in certain circumstances and by
withdrawing approval of exclusivity once a patient population exceeds 200,000,
the bill would weaken incentives to develop orphan drugs. Finally, the Presi-
dent noted that the patient limit rule applied retroactively, which would send
a troublesome signal regarding the Government's ability to change incentives
unilaterally.
Since the President's veto, a number of proposals have been made to reform
the Act, most importantly S.
2060, introduced by Senators Kassebaum and Metzenbaum in 1991.23 Many
of that bill's main features track H.R.
4638; the bill also introduces the concept of a sales cap. Since it is likely
that any eort to reform the Act in 1994
will be patterned to some degree after 5. 2060, this paper will describe the
bill in some detail.24
Notably, the bill extended the period of marketing exclusivity from seven to
nine years and provided two years of exclusivity under all circumstances, while
dropping the concept of shared exclusivity.25 Companies requesting orphan drug
designations were also required to make a projection as to the number of persons
who will be aected by the disease or conditions three years from the date of
approval. Under Section 3, once HHS determined that the cumulative net sales
of a drug reached $150 million during the period of exclusivity, HHS would begin
to review any other applications pending for the designation. Once cumulative
net sales reached $200 million, exclusivity is terminated, and other applications
may be approved.
5. 2060, then, is a radical attempt to refocus the Act on true orphan drugs
for rare diseases and to use the threatened loss of exclusivity to limit prices for
orphan drugs. The question, however, is whether this attempt is so overinclusive
that it weakens the incentives for companies to develop orphan drugs. The
author believes that the bill, however well intentioned, goes too far. This paper
will analyze each proposed reform (and a few ideas not formally part of the bill)
with a view to predicting its practical eect if a similar bill became law. On the
(perhaps wishful) assumption that recent press reports accurately reect the
1994 bill, that will be examined as well.
3
4Reportedly, the new Metzenbaum-Kassebaum bill will reduce the period of
exclusivity to four years, with an extension to seven years if total sales have
not exceeded $200 million in the four-year period. Marketing exclusivity would
end once a condition has more than 200,000 people; the bill also restores the
concept of shared exclusivity as in H.R. 4638.26
Exclusivity
Virtually all commentators believe that marketing exclusivity is the crux of
the Act.27 As Commissioner Kessler testied in 1992, [a]ny weakening of the
exclusivity provisions almost certainly will discourage development of orphan
drugs in the future. This point cannot be emphasized strongly enough.28 In
fact, the National Commission on Orphan Diseases recommended in 1989 that
the seven-year period of exclusivity be increased, and Senator Hatch report-
edly favored in 1992 a program for nine years' exclusivity for drugs with very
small patient populations.29 The 1993 proposal of the Biotechnology Industry
Association reportedly reduced exclusivity from seven to ve years but also
provided for a ve-year extension if the patient population was under l00,000.~
Practically, this would extend exclusivity to 10 years for most orphan drugs.
Yet critics argue that [i]t is dicult to call something an orphan when two
or more entities want to be the parent.31 So during debate on H.R. 4638, Repre-
sentative Bliley defended shared exclusivity as based on fairness for companies
that truly develop the same drug simultaneously.32 On the other hand, while
few orphan drugs {indeed, this would likely apply only to the most protable {
would be subject to (forced) shared exclusivity, a company would theoretically
have to consider losing 50 percent of the market.~ And opponents argued that
a deal is a deal... . you can't change the rules in the middle of the game.~
For these reasons, as late as February 1990, the National Organization for Rare
Diseases opposed shared exclusivity in any shape or form.35
It is far from clear that a duopoly would lower price. Not only do companies
have a need to recover their costs, but, as the case of r-hGH shows, competition
among two exclusive suppliers has not lowered price.~ In fact, total costs may
well rise because both companies will maintain competing marketing eorts.
This eect would only be magnied by extending the period of exclusivity for
products where exclusivity is shared. Some would respond that lengthening the
period gives companies a chance to spread out costs over a longer period (thus
4
5lowering the initial price), but companies need to generate money for future
R&D as well as maximize prot.
Given this, from the perspective of patients, there is little benet from re-
forming the provisions on exclusivity, and the dangers of doing so are potentially
great. Under the regulations implementing the Act, FDA may revoke market
exclusivity if the holder cannot assure the availability of adequate supplies of
the drug.37 This
{ perhaps combined with a mandatory giveaway program discussed infra {
should be the limit of tampering with exclusivity. That having been said, the
1994 Kassebaum-Metzenbaum proposal (though without shared exclusivity) is
the best attempt made so far, precisely because it provides for an automatic
extension of exclusivity to the current seven years for most orphan drugs.
Shared exclusivity is already permitted { even encouraged { on a voluntary
basis;~ the case for making it mandatory is simply not proven. Tempting as
it is to seek to prevent abuses of exclusivity, if we accept the testimony of one
interested observer, new designations for 1991 { the year after the controversy
over H.R. 4638 {dropped by 25 percent.39
Patient Cap
Current law requires that an orphan drug not be designated if the total
population aected by the condition exceeds 200,000. Yet this limit applies to
each indication, not the total population which could benet from the drug.
Some commentators therefore have argued for a patient cap, particularly given
the rapid spread of AIDS above the 200,000 level. This could be accomplished
by requiring withdrawal of exclusivity once the patient population rises above
200,00040 or, alternatively, by requiring FDA before designation to estimate the
patient population three years after designation.
It is franidy dicult to see how this would work in practice. FDA hardly
has the resources to monitor this, save in extreme cases such as AIDS. Reliable
data on patient populations is hard to nd, especially concerning patients not
currently under treatment.41 The cap would act as a positive deterrent for dis-
eases with populations near the patient cap (multiple sclerosis is perhaps the
best example); if the scientic or clinical denition of the disease changed, a
company could lose exclusivity. Proponents would retort that any drug in this
category is not a true orphan and thus does not deserve the benets of the Act.
The revision of the denition of a rare disease
5
6to a 200,000 patient standard has lasted for nearly a decade. Very clearly,
certain patient groups believe they are within the statute's scope; it would be
cruel to remove them.
Beyond this, a patient cap raises many other practical questions: Would the
200,000 patient limit be breached through o-label uses?42 Should a company
be forced to keep records of the number of patients using an orphan drug?
What about patients who (for whatever reason) are not prescribed the drug but
prefer other forms of therapy? Would FDA just react to a citizen's petition
from a competitor alleging breach of the limit? Such a petition would engender
protracted administrative litigation and waste FDA resources. In any event,
unless the date is within one year of.the end of exclusivity, FDA will not likely
have begun approval of a competitor's NDA. Thus exclusivity would de facto
continue at least for a time.
The special case of AIDS in fact argues agalnst imposing a patient cap. As
Acting Commissioner Benson noted, [e]arly in the AIDS epidemic, it was very
dicult to nd any manufacturers willing to invest in products for the disease,
and the Orphan Drug Act provided an important incentive at that time.43 Not
only did the actual number of AIDS patients grow, but the denition of AIDS
itself changed over time { and with a patient cap, the resulting uncertainty
would have been a disincentive for companies to invest in research.
It is doubtful there will be another crisis similar to AIDS, but even if there
is, the Act would provide crucial incentives at the beginning of the epidemic.
If there must be some form of patient cap, by far the best would be simply to
amend 21 CFR x316.29(c) and give FDA discretion to withdraw designation in
the case of sharply exploding population. Only FDA can make the necessarily
individualized determination whether the rise in patient population combined
with the availability of alternative drugs would justify revoking exclusivity.
If the social goal of the Act is to pursue the drug to its greatest public
good,45 then a patient cap counters that goal. This is particularly true for
drugs developed using biotechnology, for the Act (in practice) often substitutes
as a surrogate for patent protection46; a cap could thus prevent full exploitation
during the period necessary to recoup the costs of research.
6
7Sales Cap/Recoupment Cap
The idea of a $200 million sales cap seems to have originated in an extrapo-
lation from FDA's regulations on generic drugs, under which a blockbuster drug
is dened as one whose sales exceed $50 million per year.47 Of all the proposed
reforms to the statute, this { perhaps even more than exclusivity reform { is the
most troubling.
Development of drugs is expensive. The price we as a nation pay for a
quality drug approval system that only permits marketing of demonstrably safe
and eective drugs is extraordinarily high developmental costs.~ The process is
fraught with uncertainty, which only heightens the expense.
The situation of each drug { its development costs, its use, and its expected
population { is dierent. Yet a cap is arbitrary. It ignores the potential of chronic
use; many of the most innovative orphan drugs must be taken for long periods
of time. Defenders of the proposal would undoubtedly argue that chronic use
implies greater protability. But this would in eect discriminate between types
of orphan drugs, to the detriment of patients' wellbeing. For companies { and
for FDA regulators { the cap would be a serious administrative burden.49 Over
time, the cap will almost certainly discourage orphan drug research: the gure
of $200 million would stay in the statute, while the cost of R&D constantly
increases. As with the patient cap idea, it is unclear whether o-label~ uses
should be included in a sales cap { 5. 2060 refers to a drug, not an indica-
tion { particularly if the manufacturer diligently discourages o-label use. Even
if it is true, as proponents claim, that 97 percent of orphan drugs can never
expect to realize sales approaching $200 million,50 the cap would disproportion-
ately impact pharmaceutical, as opposed to biotechnology, companies. As one
biotechnology leader has said: there's no $200 million biotech drug out there.51
Some advocates favor the sales cap simply as a way of encouraging lower
prices.52While the argument might have some validity if the sales cap were cal-
culated on an annual basis, it is simply wrong for cumulative sales. A drug
company must recoup its costs of development. There are basically three ways
to do so: sale of the drug, government grants for development, and extension of
the tax credit. (The fourth, cross-subsidization of orphan drugs by other drugs,
is called into question by the cap.) The third would cost the government rev-
enue, and the second entails more government spending (precisely the problem
complained of in the case of EPO). Even Jean McGuire of the AIDS Action
Council admitted that it is not certain that prices for AIDS drugs would be
lower
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8if they were outside the Act. Wax 63. This view was supported by a San
Francisco group called Direct Action for Treatment Access, which called the
idea impossible. ... A drug that gets approval has to pull far more than its own
weight.~ In any event, the cap could also have a deleterious eect on manufac-
turer drug giveaway programs.
Finally, the bill's denition of cumulative net sales is unsatisfying. Arguably,
to reect the true social benets and costs, the gure of savings in government
health programs should be included.~ Given the highly varied situations from
drug to drug, if Congress insisted on some form of a sales cap, it would seem
better to proceed by FDA rulemaking than by detailed statutory formulas.
Consideration of Orphan Drug Issues Within HHS
H.R. 4638 and S. 2060 would have established within HHS an Oce for
Orphan Diseases and Conditions at a level within the Department with sucient
authority to assure full implementation of [itsj functions and
responsibilities. This Oce would replace the Orphan Products Board es-
tablished under the 1983 Act. HHS strongly continues to oppose the provision
as a weakening of FDA control over implementation of the Act and an intru-
sive eort to manage orphan product development. Commissioner Kessler has
termed the provision unnecessary and redundant.55 By contrast, some rare dis-
ease advocates strongly support it.~
Some have asserted that this provision was the real reason for the veto of
H.R. 4638.~~ Irrespectively, one should examine what eect it would have on
the operation of the Act within I-IHS and FDA. From the perspective of agency
management, perhaps the most objectionable feature of the section is the pro-
posed advisory committee. The committee, appointed by the Secretary, would
consist of ve representatives of organizations of persons with rare diseases, three
research scientists, and three representatives of health-related companies.~ Its
duties are extremely broad: to advise the Oce in carrying out the fun~tions of
the Oce under this section. The committee would, in short, have a continuing
role, which could easily become a serious intrusion into agency management,
both in the operation of the orphan drug program itself and in terms of the
priority given orphan drugs within FDA and HHS. The committee was qulte
directly intended to be a strong advocate for devoting increasing amounts of
FDA resources to orphan drug concerns.
It seems dicult to believe that such a committee is really necessary. The
success of the Act, as attested
8
9by the number of orphan drug designations, shows that industry is mindful of
the advantages the Act oers. A perceived need for better coordination between
relevant agencies can be met without shifting the center of gravity in orphan
drugs towards the committee. HHS should simply ensure that individuals from
all relevant agencies serve actively on a revitalized Board.
Where the committee could have its most serious { and potentially delete-
rious { eect is in the targeting of research towards conditions which have not
yet benetted from the Act. While government has a legitimate role in calling
attention to conditions which would benet from more intensive research, it is
easy to imagine that the process might result in the government attempting to
nd a company to undertake research. It is at best unclear that government is
capable of making such a determination { the eects of which, for good or ill,
would be magnied greatly by the provision for seven-year exclusivity.59 FDA's
opinion is similar: Government is ill-equipped to do that kind of a job.60
Windfall Prots Tax
Representative Fortney H. (Pete) Stark has twice introduced bills to enact
a windfall prots tax for orphan drugs which are excessively protable.61 The
75 percent tax would apply once a company has recouped development costs;
companies would be allowed only a 25% prot over the yearly cost of production
and marketing.62
The advantage of the approach is that it would avoid any detriment to the
exclusive marketing provisions of the Act. Yet notably absent from the Stark
bills is any rollback provision, either for new drug research generally or for
orphan drug research in particular. The proposition is more defensible if the
companies concerned truly are earning windfall prots from an activity justied
by its social rather than its commercial utility. Since the purpose of the Act is to
encourage development of orphan drugs, that purpose is furthered if companies
are encouraged to plow their prots back into development of other orphan
drugs. (This~ would presumably reduce the need for Federal funding of orphan
drug research as well.)
Instead, Stark's bills, particularly the second, are baldly anti-competitive
and would reduce eorts into research on orphan drugs. Corporate social re-
sponsibility cannot simply be enacted by statute. The tax would
9
10operate precisely opposite to the purposes of the Act and the choices Congress
made in enacting it.
Stark's bill does, however, include pre-dlinical development costs (less the
amount of Federal funds used for development) as part of the calculation as
to when the windfall begins. The tax would be far more palatable if it were
combined with an extension of the tax credit to include pre-dlinical research.
Alternatively, the tax credit could be made refundable, to ensure that the tax
does not act as a disincentive to research.~
'Salami Slicing and the Denition of Clinical Superiority
Many critics have noted that the Act functions as an invitation to scope out
a narrower group than may otherwise benet from the treatment to gain the
incentive of marketing exclusivityY~ This salami slicing has the potential to be
a serious problem, although the record of designations shows that the facts do
not show an exclusive pattern. Thus, for instance, Botulinum Toxin Type A has
received six orphan designations, held by three dierent companies.65 On the
other hand, one company (Homann-La Roche) holds seven designations (but
only one approval) for recombinant interferon ~-2A, and Biogen holds six of
seven designations for recombinant interferon ~66 While this ralses the prospect
that one company may corner the market, it does at least reward the company
which exhaustively researches a drug's potential uses before seeking FDA
approval.
FDA's new regulations and participation in the drug approval process help
to guard against salami-slicing and should preclude any related changes to the
Act. The Centers for Drugs and Biologics have a role in determining whether a
proposed study is appropriate or whether the indication should be widened.67
Broadly, FDA's standard is that the proposed indication must not be an obvious
manipulation of the law to attempt to obtain approval for a minor indication
when it is clear that the intended use is for a much broader indication.~
The controversies over aerosolized pentamidine and hGl-I raised the ques-
tion of whether FDA should approve new orphan drugs if they are chemically
dierent in any way or whether there must be a showing of clinical superiority.
FDA has decided strongly in favor of a standard of clinical superiority, de-
termined by greater eectiveness, greater safety in a substantial portion of the
target populations, or, in unusual cases where the drug makes a major contri-
bution to patient care.69 Thus a later recombinant version of a drug may be
approved as well as the
10
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natural product because safety is enhanced, even if the dosage remains the
same.
The third category is intended to be narrow,7' and it quite deliberately gives
FDA discretion to proceed on an individualized basis. (Cost, however, is not
of itself a factor.) This kind of discretion in FDA might well have resolved
the situation of aerosolized pentamidine. Admittedly FDA is not qualied to
make an economic judgment on a drug, but it is able to make a therapeutic
judgment.72
More directly, the standard of clinical superiority accords with the statute's
emphasis on marketing exclusivity. Given the strong incentive of marketing ex-
clusivity, it seems obvious that a company would, rather than simply sleeping
on its rights, want to seek to develop better forms of the drug, including easier
forms of administration. The alternative { approval of a designation if a second
drug is structurally dierent73 { would virtually undermine marketing exclusiv-
ity { it is too easy, in the case of a highly protable drug such as hGH, simply to
construct a chemically dierent version of the drug. Proponents respond that
for a true orphan drug of limited commercial value,' no company would spend
a lot of money and devote precious resources on the development of a second
NDA.74 In the author's view, this too casually ignores the progress of science {
if a drug is found to be useful for additional indications (not all of which can be
predicted before approval), a company may well have the incentive to undertake
additional research and should have the ability to benet from its discovery if
it is in fact the rst to be approved for the additional indication.
Mandatory Giveaway Prog'-anis
In 1992, Senators Hatch and Thurmond reportedly proposed that rms
which have received orphan drug approvals develop a mandatory access program75
to ensure availability of orphan drugs to those who cannot aord them. The
1992 hearings on proposed reforms to the Act focused attention on access to drug
giveaway programs. Partly in response to this, other eorts are being made to
expand access to these programs; both the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing As-
sociation and Senator Pryor's Aging Committee have prepared directories of
the programs.76 Yet the supporters of 5. 2060 were skeptical that giveaway
programs would work in practice, for fear that other patients would pay higher
rates for the drug and needy patients would not receive information about the
programs.77
11
12Giveaway programs are not a complete solution, and mandating giveaways
might have some disincentive for production. But the discouraging eect would
seem to be less than if Congress were to take other actions such as reducing
exclusivity or proposing a sales cap. A sales cap might well increase the level
of drugs given away. FDA could eectively do the same thing by requiring
longer clinical trials before an orphan drug is approved; in the trials, the cost
to patients is sharply regulated.
Liability Reform
The potential for liability may act as a disincentive to development of orphan
drugs, since the smaller population precludes companies from spreading out the
costs of liability risks over a large patient population. This problem, however,
was not addressed in S. 2060 or similar bills. One idea proposed is to have a
1% fund from the sale of orphan drugs, similar to that for childhood vaccines,
in exchange for a liability waiver.78
Separate Treatment for AIDS and Other Conditions
Some commentators have simply proposed removing all AIDS-related drugs
out of the Orphan Drug Act,
because of the large AIDS population and fears regarding marketing exclu-
sivity and price.79 Regardless, the
80
development of drugs for AIDS which receive orphan status continues. While
AIDS itself is no longer a
legitimate orphan designation,8' opportunistic infections with smaller pa-
tient populations continue to be covered. It is important to remember that the
Act played a crucial role in the early development of treatments for AIDS, in-
cluding AZT, designated in 1985 and, in 1987, the twenty-rst orphan drug to
receive marketing approval.~
AIDS is of course a serious public health crisis which deserves national atten-
tion. But is would be contrary to the purpose of the Act to have considerations
relating to AIDS drugs in eect swallow the other diseases which fall under
the concern of the Act. To that extent, a separate national policy for AIDS
{ guided by a separate statutory structure { should be seriously considered.
More generally (and more easily), one should simply amend the Act to require
that any disease dened as an epidemic of large proportions by the Centers for
Disease Control is not an orphan disease.83 But this poses the danger, as Ms.
Meyers admitted, that biotechnology companies would decline to perform AIDS
research because of uncertainty over patent rights.
12
13Similarly, some advocates have proposed special legislation for dedesignating
orphan drugs (such as hGH) which have seen extraordinary protabilityY~ This
accords with the recommendation of the Chair of the National Commission on
Orphan Diseases for surgical action by Congress to correct specic abuses85 and
would send a strong signal that abuses under the Act will not be tolerated. It
would also avoid potentially harmful tinkering with the Act's basic structure.
But separate legislation can be time-consuming and dicult to enact.
Conclusion
The question, then, becomes a dicult balance. All sides recognize that the
Act's structure of incentives has provided tremendous impetus for the develop-
ment of orphan drugs, yet all equally recognize that there have been abuses.
Unquestionably the Act { particularly counting its abuse { has cost the Federal
Government signicant resources.
Does this make sense? Very clearly it does on the moral plane.85 On the
scientic level, the question then becomes whether research and development of
drugs generally is furthered by development of orphan drugs {whether learning
more about rare diseases translates into more understanding of common ones.
Many drug and biotechnology companies, as evidenced by their behavior
under the Act, would argue that
the proposition is sensible. Assuming this is correct, then, in contrast to the
views of some in Congress, the author
does not view prot per se as the problem. As one developer of orphan drugs
has written, it is important to judge
a new orphan candidate at the time the research is started, and not after
the pioneer has proved to the world that
a wonderful new miracle drug has been discovered.87
If, as in the case of Lyphomed and pentamidine, a company is Able to use
an orphan designation { by denition, research that few are willing to carry
out { to ensure its corporate future (and help raise capital for future drug
development), it seems unfair to deny that possibility. Companies feel free to
reinvest in new drug development because the Act's incentives provide economic
certainty.88 This is particularly true for new biotech companies that may only
have one product on the market. Are they not permitted to make some return
on investment, if only to invest in new drug development? Again, that is a
social and economic choice Congress made when it enacted the Act.
13
14Even despite the abuses under the Act, there is also a question of funda-
mental fairness, of the behavior of government towards those it regulates and
taxes. People who invested in orphan product development with the promise of
market exclusivity should not be punished for taking the Federal Government
at its word.~ In short, do the abuses justify retroactively reducing incentives for
orphan drug development for all companies?
One solution seems clear: to reinforce discretion in FDA, as the nal regula-
tions do for issues such as the denition of clinical superiority and appropriate
patient populations. An overriding image in food and drug law is to view the
FDA as Gulliver in Lilliput { sought to be restrained by a multitude of tiny
bonds, he nevertheless breaks free. Here, though, FDA discretion is both appro-
priate and expected by the statute. Signicantly, the National Commission on
Orphan Diseases recommended that abuses be handled individually, not make
systemic changes to the Act.90 This advice, if followed, virtually demands wide
FDA jurisdiction to make changes in the Act's operation; Congressional action
is simply too slow to correct most abuses and frequently cuts with too wide a
scythe.
Yet FDA cannot solve one outstanding problem with the Act, price. It is not
an economic agency. One can be deeply moved, even angered, by the serious
plight of those who cannot aord orphan drugs and yet reluctantly conclude
that no major changes should be made in the Act. Without the Act's incentives,
how would the drugs have even come to market? Without the company making
something of a prot, how can it aord drug giveaway programs? Price is simply
not in FDA's jurisdiction.
FDA can, however, focus debate on the medical analysis of the real costs
of drugs: If an orphan product is a substitute for lengthy, expensive hospital
care that runs hundreds of thousands of dollars per year, or a costly surgical
procedure, what is the appropriate charge [?J~' And the fact remains that most
orphan drugs are approved for conditions with very small patient populations
or small occurrences, such as various toxicologies.
Is it good public policy to drive an overhaul~ of the Act based on a handful
of controversial drugs out of over nearly 600 designated? To answer that, one
must decide what is the public policy behind the Act. If the purpose of the Act
is to encourage research into drugs for rare diseases, then the Act should not be
tinkered with. One must consider the real cost of therapy { including the current
alternatives of dierent or no therapy. Any full accounting of the benets and
costs of the Act must also include savings to patients and insurersY3 By this
14
15measure, signicant reform of the Orphan Drug Act deserves the Scotch
'verdict of not proven.
The granting or repeal of economic incentives is a social choice. Congress
made a clear choice in 1983 to encourage research and development of drugs to
treat rare diseases. It set the incentives high enough to be attractive to major
drug companies. It understood that there might well be abuses of the ActY4
Had Congress simply wanted to provide a break even amount, it could have
done so. The Act's work is not done. Drugs are still needed for many orphan
diseases including narcolepsy, multiple sclerosis, and many others. The implicit
bargain of the 1983 Act was market exclusivity { and the potential for windfall
{ in exchange for the expensive research. To change the bargain now { and run
the risk of jeopardizing the Act's success in treating those who suer from rare
diseases { is like penalizing Sutter for nding gold in Califorma.
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